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Structural Human Rights Violations:
The True Face of Mexico’s War on Crime
by Stephanie Erin Brewer*

I

Introduction

Mexico focuses ever more
on the actions of drug traffickers, reporting
shootouts between government forces and criminals in the
Mexican government’s war against organized crime. Such a picture, however, conceals many of the true dimensions and victims
of Mexico’s violent war. In reality, the government carries out
its war on crime through an array of human rights abuses whose
victims range from detained suspects, innocent and guilty alike,
to individuals and communities with no connection to crime.
This article, which forms part one of a two-part series examining Mexico’s public security policies from a human rights
perspective and presents an overview of some of the human
rights violations that characterize Mexico’s security operations
today.1
nternational news coverage of
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Federal soldiers during a door-to-door house search in Culiacán,
Sinaloa State, Mexico.

Context: The Militarization of
Public Security in Mexico

that drive insecurity, including not only endemic flaws in law
enforcement practices but also extreme disparities in access
to resources and quality work and educational opportunities.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Calderón administration
continued to increase its reliance on frontal combat security
policies in 2008, announcing the deployment of more soldiers
to existing and new operations in states such as Chihuahua,
Oaxaca, Chiapas, Coahuila, Sonora, Tabasco, and Campeche,6
as well as promoting harsh criminal justice reforms, including
provisions that violate basic standards of due process.

In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón began his
administration by launching large-scale militarized crime-fighting operations in Mexican states including Sinaloa, Durango,
Sonora, Michoacán, Baja California, and Guerrero. These
operations, portrayed as a necessary response to drug-related
violence, have deployed military and federal police agents
in checkpoints on highways and roads, as well as involving
searches of homes, sweeps of neighborhoods, and the detention
of countless individuals. To carry out these operations, soldiers
perform numerous public security tasks that legally fall within
the competence of the civilian police or public prosecutors. An
average of 45,000 soldiers now participate monthly in such
operations,2 with the Department of Public Security declaring in
2008 that it was going “all-out” to step up its “direct fight” and
“frontal combat” against criminals.3
Despite these highly visible militarized security operations,
the number of killings associated with organized drug crime
in Mexico has more than tripled over the past three years,
going from over 1,500 in 20054 to over 5,500 in 2008.5 These
data highlight the ineffectiveness of the militarized frontal
combat approach to drug trafficking. Indeed, the frontal combat approach, by reducing the concept of public security to a
territorial war against criminals, fails to address the factors

Unmasking Mexico’s Drug War: Grave
Violations to Fundamental Rights
The participation of the armed forces in civilian policing
tasks and the general intensification of Mexico’s war on crime
under the Calderón administration have led to a growing incidence of serious human rights violations. Over the past two years
these have included dozens of arbitrary executions (including
numerous cases in which soldiers have shot and killed civilians
attempting to drive through military checkpoints), a significant
number of rapes, frequent arbitrary detentions, routine warrantless searches of homes, and the widespread use of torture. The
number of reports alleging human rights violations by Mexico’s
Department of Defense (army and air force) received by the
National Human Rights Commission more than sextupled during the first two years of the Calderón administration, going
from 182 in 20067 to 1,230 in 2008, causing the Department of
Defense to become the government agency against whom more
violations are alleged than any other agency.8
As another indicator, national media articles from January
2007 through November 2008 registered at least 101 cases
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“Indeed, the frontal combat approach, by reducing the
concept of public security to a territorial war against
criminals, fails to address the factors that drive insecurity,
including not only endemic flaws in law enforcement
practices but also extreme disparities in access to resources
and quality work and educational opportunities.”
reported since January 2007.13 Other arbitrary executions have
included the shooting of two campesinos in Lachivía, Oaxaca,
in August 200814 and the shooting of 16-year-old Iván Calderón
in front of a military camp in Morelia, Michoacán, on May 12,
2008.15 There is no indication that any of these victims was
engaged in illegal activities of any kind.
Other types of human rights violations that characterize the
crime war are exemplified by the generalized abuses that took
place in Carácuaro, Nocupétaro, and Huetamo, in the state of
Michoacán, during the first week of May 2007. Following an
ambush in which several soldiers were killed by criminals, the
army initiated a search for the perpetrators that quickly turned
into an excuse for indiscriminate repression against the region’s
population. More than 1,000 soldiers maintained the area under
a virtual siege for three days, while the mayors of Carácuaro and
Nocupétaro reported “countless” cases of torture and warrantless searches of homes.16 Several residents who attempted to file
reports of human rights abuses with the state human rights commission were prevented from doing so, beaten, and threatened
in retaliation.17 Soldiers also sexually abused four minor girls in
Nocupétaro, Michoacán. After interrogating the girls about drug
cartel activity in the area, beating them, and threatening to kill
them, soldiers took the victims to a military base and sexually
assaulted them.18 The National Human Rights Commission,
which documented the case, later verified that two of the girls
had been raped.19
It is also worth noting the pattern of attacks and threats
against journalists who attempt to cover police and military
operations. A paradigmatic example of abuses in this category
include attacks and threats by soldiers against journalist Emilio
Gutiérrez Soto and his family in Chihuahua in May 2008, which
forced him to flee the country and seek asylum in the United
States.20
Finally, the war on crime lends itself to the existing tendency
toward criminalization of social protest and the persecution of
social movements by Mexican state authorities, producing a
high number of unjustified detentions of social activists who
are accused of some form of criminal activity. Authorities make
use of the war on drug trafficking as a pretext for the repression of indigenous communities, whose leaders may be accused
of organized crime.21 Meanwhile, in states such as Chiapas

or generalized situations of human rights violations by the
military, which included shootings, torture, illegal searches, and
aggression against vulnerable populations such as indigenous
communities and migrants.9 In the case of Chihuahua State,
for example, between April and November 2008 alone (that is,
after the implementation of the militarized security operation
Joint Operation Chihuahua), the state witnessed at least thirteen
cases of military abuses reported in the media.10 According to
the National Human Rights Commission, torture and arbitrary
detention have been among the most frequent violations, and
in the case of persons detained in military bases, “the victims
are interrogated by military personnel who extract information
through torture: beatings, electric shocks, submersion in water,
placing plastic bags over their heads. . . .”11
The dramatic surge in reported military human rights violations following the implementation of militarized anti-crime
operations is not a phenomenon explained by the wayward
actions of a few isolated individuals or regiments. Instead, it
is a direct consequence of using the military for policing tasks
that is both widespread (having been reported in the majority
of Mexico’s 32 states) and systematic. Among other factors,
since soldiers are trained for war, members of the armed forces
often react with the mentality that they are involved in a war
against enemy combatants, leading to the excessive use of force.
Another structural factor perpetuating systematic military abuses
is the historic impunity for these abuses that stems largely from
the use of military jurisdiction to investigate such crimes, to be
discussed further below.
Illustrative examples of specific military human rights violations committed under the current administration include the
case of four civilians shot and killed by soldiers on the evening
of March 26, 2008 on a road in the state of Sinaloa. The victims were not armed, nor is there any evidence that they were
participating in any crime. Another example from Sinaloa state
occurred when soldiers shot and killed five family members at
a military checkpoint in La Joya, Sinaloa, on June 1, 2007. In
this case, soldiers opened fire on eight members of the Esparza
Galaviz family. Five of the family members, all women and
children, died in this attack, while the other three (including two
more children) sustained injuries.12 This is one of more than
seventeen cases of violations committed at a military checkpoint
8

migrants are robbed and attacked by state authorities who sometimes cite the need to search for arms and drugs.22

Torture in particular continues to be a hallmark of Mexican
police work. Researchers for Mexico’s National Human Rights
Center have concluded that roughly two-thirds of Mexico’s
investigatory police rely on torture to obtain information from
detainees.30 Here too, entrenched impunity perpetuates violations. Although more than one out of five of the recommendations issued by Mexico City’s Human Rights Commission over
its fifteen-year period of operations have been for cases of torture
committed by city authorities, with city prosecutors opening 197
investigations based on complaints of torture from July 2005 to
July 2008, none has led to the conviction of those responsible.31
In Jalisco, despite the enactment fourteen years ago of a law
against torture, no official has yet been convicted of this crime.32
In the major city of Monterrey, Nuevo León, the ten-year-old
law against torture has led to just one conviction.33

Entrenched Impunity and the Illegal Extension
of Military Jurisdiction
A key factor facilitating the human rights abuses highlighted
above is Mexico’s environment of entrenched impunity for
human rights violations. Indeed, unlike other Latin American
countries, where years of struggle have led to trials and convictions for many human rights violators from the era of military
dictatorships, Mexico has not held accountable any perpetrators
of its own Dirty War of the late 1960s through the early 1980s.23
The absence of such accountability has set the stage for continued impunity for violations today.
In the sphere of military human rights violations, Mexico’s
continued use of military jurisdiction to investigate human rights
crimes helps to maintain impunity. Article 13 of the Mexican
Constitution establishes that “military jurisdiction subsists for
crimes and offenses against military discipline. . .”24 However,
“military discipline” is defined by the army, in Article 57 of its
Code of Military Justice, in an expansive manner that includes
even crimes committed by military personnel that violate civilians’ basic human rights.25 These crimes are thus investigated
and tried by military authorities who lack impartiality and independence from the agents they are charged with investigating.
Numerous international human rights bodies have explained
that Mexico’s use of military jurisdiction to investigate and try
human rights cases is not permissible under international law
and prevents accountability for violations. Former UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture Sir Nigel Rodley reported after a visit to
Mexico, “Military personnel appear to be immune from civilian
justice and generally protected by military justice,”26 and specified, “[c]ases of serious crimes committed by military personnel against civilians [should] be subject to civilian justice.”27
Similar calls have been issued to the Mexican government by
the UN Committee Against Torture, the Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
Executions, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, and the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention.28 It is also worth noting the constant jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which establishes
that military jurisdiction “is not the competent jurisdiction to
investigate and, if applicable, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations.”29 At the end of 2008, however,
Mexican authorities continued to apply military jurisdiction to
cases of human rights abuses in violation of the Constitution and
the international standards listed above.

“The dramatic surge in
reported military human
rights violations following
the implementation of
militarized anti-crime
operations is not a
phenomenon explained by
the wayward actions of a
few isolated individuals or
regiments. Instead, it is a
direct consequence of using
the military for policing
tasks that is both widespread
. . . and systematic.”

Violations in Mexico’s Criminal
Justice System
Military abuses are far from the only type of violation that
characterizes Mexico’s war on crime. Rather, for individuals arrested by police in Mexico, human rights violations are
systematic and widespread at both the state and federal level.
Among subjects of great concern in this regard are the violation of the rights to personal liberty, due process, and physical
integrity.

In light of the dysfunctional model by which Mexico’s
criminal justice system has long functioned—one that too
often convicts defendants based on confessions extracted under
torture, which in many cases are not true—the comprehensive
reform of the criminal justice system has been one of the longstanding demands of the Mexican human rights movement.
9

flict. . .”36 For those who might still have qualms over the annulment or violation of their human rights, the Calderón administration has made clear that persons suspected of organized
criminal activities (portrayed in official discourse as the only
population affected negatively by the authorities’ war against
crime) are not normal citizens in any case, but rather enemies
of the State: “in this war against crime, against the enemies of
Mexico, there will be no truce made nor quarter given.”37 This
dehumanizing mentality is also apparent among members of
the security forces, such as one high-profile army general who
summarized the results of a shoot-out in which he reported that
fourteen individuals had been killed by stating simply, “[now]
there are fourteen fewer criminals.”38
In recent months, the government has moved beyond a mere
false dichotomy between human rights and public security, and
has sought to appropriate human rights discourse to portray
the government’s drug war as affirmatively in favor of human
rights. In December 2008, Calderón explained during a ceremony to present the National Human Rights Award:

Unfortunately, Felipe Calderón’s 2007 proposals for criminal
justice reform made clear that respect for human rights was not
the defining factor in his plan. The modified version of his proposed reform package that eventually became law and reformed
the Mexican Constitution in June 2008 contained some essential
advances, but also serious setbacks for human rights, publicized
by the government as necessary measures in the war on crime.
Among the advances contained in the recent criminal justice
reforms, the most notable is the adoption of an adversarial,
oral criminal justice system. Following years of advocacy by
civil society, academics, and experts in this field, Article 20
of Mexico’s Constitution now explicitly establishes a criminal
justice system based on oral trials for criminal defendants, to be
implemented gradually over the next seven years.
Among the setbacks contained in the same criminal justice
reform is the elevation to Constitutional status of arraigo.
Arraigo is a type of detention, already common in Mexico, in
which prosecutors may detain individuals for months prior to
charging them with any crime. This logic of ‘detain first and
investigate later’ has naturally encouraged the use of torture
during the period of arraigo to produce leads regarding the
possible participation of the detainee or others in crimes. In
cases of suspected organized crime, Article 16 of Mexico’s
Constitution now provides that prosecutors may place individuals under arraigo for up to eighty days.34 This prolonged period
of detention without charge violates the right to liberty established in the American Convention on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As Human
Rights Watch has pointed out, the eighty-day period of precharge detention now authorized in the Mexican Constitution is
also “the longest of its kind in any Western democracy. In other
countries, the limit for any form of pre-charge detention. . . is
generally less than seven days.”35
The same set of criminal justice reforms also incorporated
into the Constitution a special “regime” of exceptional measures
for individuals accused of involvement in organized crime,
which restricts due process rights and applies starting from the
phase of investigation. This special regime of exception allows
for intrusive and human rights-violating measures (such as
arraigo and relaxed evidentiary standards) that undermine basic
due process guarantees to the detriment of those investigated,
charged, or sentenced within its framework.
By establishing two separate justice systems in the Mexican
Constitution—one for organized crime and another for common
crimes—the reforms in effect translate into one criminal justice
system for those seen as citizens and another for those seen as
enemies of the State. They divide Mexican society into those
who possess human rights, on one hand, and those who are seen
as enemies first and human beings second.

“. . . the principal human rights challenge facing
Mexico today comes from the unpunished action of
crime . . . if we are to transform Mexico into a country characterized by the rule of law and human rights,
where the latter are fully respected, it is clear that the
public and governmental authorities must join forces
[against] this principal challenge of Mexican society.
...
This is the reason for the [militarized public security]
operations, in which we strengthen the power of the
State in regions that are dominated by the unpunished
action of crime.”39
This argument pays lip service to human rights as a concept,
yet seeks to divert attention from government authorities’ failure
to respect a broad spectrum of human rights by convincing the
public that organized criminals, the enemies of the State, are the
real source of human rights violations.40 In this way, the government seeks to neutralize one of the human rights movement’s
most powerful tools—the moral capital of the words ‘human
rights’—by turning it into a weapon in its own arsenal as it
wages the drug war.

Conclusion
Rather than a just war against enemies of the State, Mexico’s
war on crime frequently takes the form of an assault against
civilians who are arbitrarily detained, tortured, or even killed
within its framework. As has historically been the case in
Mexico’s criminal justice system, these and other violations
often fall disproportionately on members of marginalized social
groups, who may or may not have any connection to crime.
As Mexico seeks to reverse the dramatic rise in drug-related
crime seen over the past few years, it is necessary to reorient the
criminal justice system to embody the positive aspects of recent
legal reforms, while taking decisive action to eliminate policies
and practices that violate human rights. In light of the widespread human rights violations committed by the military, in a
strategy of force that has not reduced overall levels of criminal
violence, the government must withdraw the armed forces from
the streets and recognize that law enforcement duties require
the action of an effective, professionalized police structure act-

Enemies of the State: Governmental Discourse
in the War on Crime
The government has frequently sought to justify its actions in
the war on crime, including human rights violations, by portraying human rights as irrelevant ideals or as an obstacle to fighting criminals. The former head of Mexico’s Special Office for
the Investigation of Organized Crime argued that the criminal
justice reforms discussed immediately above were necessary
to fight crime because “[w]e do not live in an ideal country fit
for the application of ideal laws, we live in a country in con10

ing in concert with an efficient judicial system. To this end,
the government should implement the system of adversarial,
oral criminal trials established in the Constitution as soon as
practicable, observing the prohibition on the use of testimony
obtained through torture and consequently catalyzing improvements in police investigatory practices. Another concrete step
urgently needed in the current context is the prosecution—in
civilian jurisdiction—of state security agents who commit torture and other human rights violations, ending the current cycle
of impunity. Such measures would in turn increase public trust
in police, as would the existence of effective police oversight
mechanisms and the recruitment and training of a better-paid
and better-educated police force. In a country in which underreporting of crimes to the authorities is the leading cause of
impunity for criminals, the advantages of these steps for human
rights and security alike are clear.

Simultaneous actions to eliminate structural causes of insecurity, such as those aimed at reducing poverty and vast disparities in access to government services, are crucial. Such
measures, sometimes erroneously dismissed as idealistic plans
that must wait until the crime problem is solved, are instead
urgent legal obligations and some of the most critical steps to
achieving security in the country (addressing these problems
also appears considerably less idealistic than a plan to achieve
security through indefinite combat against a self-replenishing
supply of criminals).
In short, as photos and headlines continue to bring news of
Mexico’s crime war to the international community, it is increasingly crucial to recall that reducing criminal violence is a goal
that neither justifies nor, evidently, is advanced by unleashing a
systematic war on the human rights of Mexico’s population.
HRB
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